Although we've already seen the first snowfall of the year here in the Finger Lakes, the Governor recently signed legislation beefing up enforcement of maximum sound levels emitted by the exhaust systems of snowmobiles used in the State. The legislation (which amends section 25.17 of the Parks, Recreation, and Historic Preservation Law), generally requires that snowmobile operators make sure that the snowmobile's muffler does not emit noise above 78 decibels (measured 50 feet away at full throttle), or 88 decibels measured from 12 feet directly behind a stationary snowmobile. The sponsors of this bill hope that, by greater enforcement of limitations on the noise created by snowmobiles, more landowners will open their property to snowmobile trail use.
Section 25.17 of the Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation Law also specifies a number of important equipment rules for snowmobile owners to follow, including the need for a headlight, tail light, adequate brakes, reflecting material affixed to the cowling, and, of course, an adequate muffler.
The following is my blog of thoughts on interesting legal developments in New York State. Nothing here should be considered legal advice (especially since none of the people and/or organizations referenced in any external articles I might link to have paid me for anything). But if any of the issues analyzed here resonate with you, please check out http://www.shofflaw.com to learn more about my law firm and areas of practice.
Wednesday, November 20, 2013
Wednesday, November 6, 2013
Is the Invocation Before a Meeting of the Elders in Greece Ceremonial Deism?
OK, I admit that this post's title might be misleading. But that's the joy of New York State geography: a plethora of Old-World names for municipalities.
Today, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in an interesting First Amendment case with local roots. In Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 33 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1103 (U.S. 2013), the Second Circuit reversed a lower court ruling in favor of the Town of Greece, NY (just outside of Rochester), finding that the totality of the circumstances in this case showed that the town violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, in that the mostly-Christian prayers before town board meetings were “an endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint. This conclusion is supported by several considerations, including the prayer-giver selection process, the content of the prayers, and the contextual actions (and inactions) of prayer-givers and town officials.” The Second Circuit distinguished the leading case of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1983) (an earlier case where the Supreme Court held that a chaplain’s prayer before the start of a state legislative session was not unconstitutional), and took pains to dissuade legislators from the “risks [of] establishing a [nonsectarian] 'civic religion'.”
Today, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in an interesting First Amendment case with local roots. In Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 33 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1103 (U.S. 2013), the Second Circuit reversed a lower court ruling in favor of the Town of Greece, NY (just outside of Rochester), finding that the totality of the circumstances in this case showed that the town violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment, in that the mostly-Christian prayers before town board meetings were “an endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint. This conclusion is supported by several considerations, including the prayer-giver selection process, the content of the prayers, and the contextual actions (and inactions) of prayer-givers and town officials.” The Second Circuit distinguished the leading case of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1983) (an earlier case where the Supreme Court held that a chaplain’s prayer before the start of a state legislative session was not unconstitutional), and took pains to dissuade legislators from the “risks [of] establishing a [nonsectarian] 'civic religion'.”
So what is a municipality to do? Of course, no government needs to have a prayer or invocation before an official meeting or event. However, many people (even those in government) may find it pleasant to “solemnize[e] an event and recognize[e] a shared religious history”. Even though I am, in fact, a member of a religious minority, I don’t personally find any Constitutional problem with such neutral, non-denominational, expressions of public solemnity at government events. Personally, I have always respected Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s “middle path” between the two prongs of the First Amendment, whereby she created (or at least championed) the concept of “ceremonial deism”. As she explained most cogently in her concurring opinion in Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2323, 159 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2004):
Given the values that the Establishment Clause was meant to serve, however, I believe that government can, in a discrete category of cases, acknowledge or refer to the divine without offending the Constitution. This category of “ceremonial deism” most clearly encompasses such things as the national motto (“In God We Trust”), religious references in traditional patriotic songs such as The Star–Spangled Banner, and the words with which the Marshal of this Court opens each of its sessions (“God save the United States and this honorable Court”). ... These references are not minor trespasses upon the Establishment Clause to which I turn a blind eye. Instead, their history, character, and context prevent them from being constitutional violations at all. ... However, “[O]ne of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his own way [lies] in the Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services.” ... Because of this principle, only in the most extraordinary circumstances could actual worship or prayer be defended as ceremonial deism. We have upheld only one such prayer against Establishment Clause challenge, and it was supported by an extremely long and unambiguous history. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (upholding Nebraska Legislature's 128–year–old practice of opening its sessions with a prayer offered by a chaplain). Any statement that has as its purpose placing the speaker or listener in a penitent state of mind, or that is intended to create a spiritual communion or invoke divine aid, strays from the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing an event and recognizing a shared religious history.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 39-40, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2324, 159 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2004)
Taking this concept outside of the religious realm, consider many of our municipal Independence Day parades where participants (maybe even government workers) sometimes dress up like 18th Century Patriots, such as George Washington or Ben Franklin. Does their costuming mean that they endorse the tarring and feathering of Englishmen? Does it mean that the town or county supports slavery (as President Washington was a slave owner)? I would say not; it’s merely a traditional mode of recognizing our nation’s history in struggle against the British Empire, with no deeper meaning.
Nevertheless, under the standards articulated by Justice O'Connor a decade ago, the predominantly Christian prayers at issue in Galloway v. Town of Greece might still fail constitutional muster, but a kind of “neutered” invocation cautioned against by the Second Circuit should not.
Sunday, November 3, 2013
Property Tax Relief for New York Farmers
Earlier this week, Governor Cuomo signed State Senate Bill 01952 which, effective immediately, amends Agriculture & Markets Law Section 304-a(4)(g) so that the “change in the base agricultural assessment value for any given year [will not] exceed two percent of the base agricultural assessment value of the preceding year.” Essentially what this means, is that land designated as agricultural (farmland) cannot have its assessed taxable value increased beyond 2% a year. Combined with the earlier enactment of a 2% property tax cap, it is hoped that this new legislation will bring much needed relief from tax increases on family farmers in the State.
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